

Possibilities and Limits of Southern European Socialism in the Iberian Peninsula. French, Portuguese and Spanish Socialists in the mid-1970s

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Abstract

This article discusses the relations between the French, Portuguese and Spanish socialist parties during the transitions to democracy in the Iberian Peninsula (1974-1977). It focuses on the attempt of these parties to establish a distinctive ideological trend, Southern European Socialism. The main argument is that the French socialists attempted to promote their ideological line—and predominantly the union between socialists and communists—in the Iberian Peninsula during the transitions to democracy. The Portuguese PS and the Spanish PSOE initially considered following this line. However, the radicalisation of the Portuguese Revolution in the sensitive context of Cold War détente, as well as the involvement of the European social democrats in both Portugal and Spain against the union of the left, prevented this model from being further considered by the PS and the PSOE. Nevertheless, all these parties showed interest in promoting a common Southern European Socialist identity that differed from European social democracy as well as from Soviet communism, considering it useful in the struggle for hegemony within the left.

The aim of this article is to analyse the relations between the French Socialist Party (*Parti Socialiste*: PSF) and its Iberian counterparts the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (*Partido Socialista Obrero Español*: PSOE) and the Portuguese Socialist Party (*Partido Socialista*: PS) in the mid-1970s, when both Spain and Portugal shifted from dictatorships to democracies. Focusing on the Portuguese Revolution and the Spanish transition, this article will examine the emergence and partial decline of the idea of Southern European Socialism,ⁱ and the ideological and political relevance that this trend, promoted by the PSF, had for all of these parties. The analysis here is based on documents held at the historical archive of the PSF,ⁱⁱ complemented by documents placed in the historical archives of the PSOE,ⁱⁱⁱ documents available online from the Mário Soares Foundation and published sources.

In the last two decades scholars of the Spanish and Portuguese transitions to democracy have paid particular attention to international factors. They have highlighted the role of the European social democrat governments and parties in promoting democracy in the Iberian Peninsula.^{iv} Following this trend, historians working on Iberian socialism have considered international factors in order to explain how the PS and PSOE could play such a prominent role during the changes of regime in Portugal and Spain.^v They have demonstrated the particular significance of the involvement of

German social democracy and the British labour movement in the Iberian Peninsula, which not only favoured the establishment of a Western kind of democracy in Portugal and Spain, but also benefited the socialist parties politically, organisationally and financially, as well as contributing to their ideological moderation.

The relevance of the connections between the German, British and Iberian socialists has overshadowed the relations between the PSOE, PS and other European parties. Furthermore, it has favoured the creation of a narrative that considers social democracy to be a uniform unit of analysis, which could be misleading considering the ideological and political diversity that coexisted in the Socialist International (SI) in the 1970s.^{vi} This perspective has been nuanced in recent years, however. New research is widening the scope to include the Scandinavian social democrats^{vii} and the French Socialist Party^{viii} among the relevant international actors involved in the Iberian transitions.

Although political scientists have studied the French, Iberian, Italian and Greek socialists as a distinctive group, differentiated from Northern social democracy, since the late 1970s,^{ix} historians have not considered this distinction until recently, after the re-emergence of the North–South European dichotomy after the 2008 crisis. Approaching the divide between Northern and Southern European socialism, José Magone and to some extent Antonio Peciccia have recently studied the ideological transformation of the PS and its political behaviour during the Carnation Revolution in terms of these two trends, noticing the appeal of the Southern European Socialist tendency, represented by the PSF, for the PS.^x Christian Salm^{xi} and Bernd Rother^{xii} have also noticed this division when analysing how European social democrats shaped the EC's southern enlargement. A step forward in this direction, in interpretative terms and in terms of the use of primary sources, are the works of Fadi Kassem, and although it is less directly connected to the Iberian transitions, Michele Di Donato. Connecting the history of European socialism to the challenges of Euro-communism, Di Donato foregrounds the relevant issue of the socialist search for a differentiated identity in the 1970s.^{xiii} Kassem in turn considers Southern European Socialism to have been a tool at the service of the ideological and political ambitions of PSF nationally as well as internationally. His work suggests that the relevance of this trend might have been greater than previously assumed for explaining both the electoral successes of Southern European socialist parties in the 1980s, and for rebalancing the forces between socialists and communists in Southern Europe.^{xiv} All of this leaves open the question of how important this trend was for the Iberian and French parties ideologically, politically and in terms of defining a differentiated identity.

Building on this scholarship, this article aims to answer this question by analysing the relations between the PSF, PSOE and PS during 1974–6 in the contexts of the change in regime on the Iberian Peninsula, competition between socialists and communists in Southern Europe and Cold War détente. The main argument is that the French socialists attempted to promote their ideological line – predominantly the union of the left – on the Iberian Peninsula during the transitions to democracy. Their objectives were to seek international validation for their strategy of uniting the left, to exert influence on the PS and PSOE, and thereby build a Southern European bloc within the SI that could counterbalance the influence of Northern social democracy within the context of increasing international interdependence, and to help these parties during the transitions to democracy.

It is argued, then, that PS and PSOE initially considered following the French strategy. They needed to create foundations for building governments of national unity, which was theoretically a requirement for post-authoritarian transitions to democracy, and at the same time, they faced competition from strong communist parties, which made it necessary for them to find a strategy to deal with the communists without being engulfed. In France, the PS and PSOE found an example for developing competitive cooperation with the communists, which seemed to be especially fruitful for the socialists. They never adopted this model, however, due to the radicalisation of the Portuguese Revolution within the sensitive context of Cold War détente. In addition, the most relevant European social democrat parties were opposed to the union of the left in both Portugal and Spain. In the case of the PSOE, domestic factors, such as the traumatic memory of the consequences for the popular front in the 1930s, and the difficult socialist–communist relations during the Civil War,^{xv} also worked against the adoption of this model, as did the nature of the transition, controlled by the regime.

Finally, it is demonstrated here that these factors worked in two directions. They also contributed to the change in the PSF's priorities in Portugal and to the reconsideration of its international strategy. Nevertheless, the French, Portuguese and Spanish socialist parties showed interest in promoting a common identity – that of radical socialists situated ideologically far from the reformist European social democracy as well as from Soviet communism – as they perceived it useful in their struggle for hegemony within the left.

International Context and the Western European Left in the Early 1970s

At the beginning of the 1970s several international events affected the evolution of the political left in Western Europe. The relative loss of international prestige of both the United States and the Soviet

Union due to their involvement in Vietnam and Czechoslovakia, respectively, together with the international relaxation brought about by superpower and intra-European détente, created a climate that facilitated the ideological distancing of some Western European communist parties from Moscow^{xvi} and increasing contact between socialists and communists. This happened in a moment of increasing international interconnectedness or globalisation that tended to grip the main international and transnational actors collectively.^{xvii} Moreover, the beginning of this decade witnessed the electoral improvement of social democrat parties in several West European countries,^{xviii} a new phase in European integration and the emergence of an international economic crisis caused by the combination of the oil shock of 1973 and the restructuration of the international monetary system. This crisis eroded the social democratic principle of promoting social equality through the redistribution of the surplus of capitalist growth (halted during the mid-1970s) precisely when many of these parties faced governmental responsibilities.

In this context, the French socialists renewed their organisation as well as their ideological line.^{xix} This was in response to national factors that interacted with the abovementioned international factors. The socialists coexisted with a strong communist party (PCF), and in the frame of the French Fifth Republic's semi-presidential system the divided left had problems reaching power. Moreover, radicalisation after May '68 and the crisis of post-war political culture led to the socialists' leftward shift. The key elements that characterised the new trend of the PS were the adoption of the concept self-management (*autogestion*)^{xx} as a way of deepening democracy and combining it with socialism, the uniting of socialists and communists, and the final aim of breaking with capitalism. This renewal aimed at allowing the left to reach power in France, advancing towards socialism in freedom and changing the balance of power within the left in favour of the socialists.

However, these ideological elements were at odds with the key characteristics of post-war social democracy –the acceptance of regulated capitalism and strong anti-communism. In the 1950s and 1960s anti-communism had been built into the ideological basis of the SI, and the French Union of the Left in 1972^{xxi} introduced fundamental changes to the International that were not welcomed by its member parties.^{xxii} Although the SI accepted the PSF,^{xxiii} its strategy was isolated within the organisation, and the International kept rejecting any ideological concession to communism.^{xxiv} While in this precarious position, the PSF sought to counterbalance the ideological predominance of Germanic social democracy within the SI, and influencing the PS and PSOE ideologically was one way of furthering this agenda.^{xxv}

At the beginning of the 1970s the socialist parties in the Iberian Peninsula also experienced deep transformations that brought them closer to the PSF. In Spain, the outlawed PSOE renewed its organisation and updated its ideological line between 1972 and 1974.^{xxvi} After a process of organic renovation that split the party,^{xxvii} the PSOE committed itself to the concept of democratic rupture^{xxviii} and to the rupture with capitalism, and promoted a new image – that of a party well-placed in the left, far from the reformist Western European social democracy and from the socialism that existed in Eastern Europe.^{xxix} Moreover, it considered establishing closer relations with the communists in order to overthrow the dictatorship.^{xxx} The Portuguese PS was created in 1973 in Bad Münstereifel. It inherited the organisation of the former Portuguese Socialist Action (*Acção Socialista Portuguesa*)^{xxxi} led by Mário Soares and updated its ideology and programme with the establishment of socialism in Portugal being the ultimate aim of the party.^{xxxii} Similar to the PSOE, the PS claimed to ‘repudiate’ social democracy for having accepted capitalism, and it also rejected the bureaucratic and totalitarian models of Eastern Europe.^{xxxiii} The Portuguese found a new cornerstone for their new kind of socialism in the concept of *autogestão* and advocated the union of the Portuguese left in order to better fight against dictatorship. The party considered that the most appropriate way to achieve socialism in Portugal would be a democratic path like the one ‘praised by the Chilean Popular Union or the French [Union of the Left]’.^{xxxiv} In fact, sponsored by the PSF, the Portuguese socialists tried to establish a pact with the Portuguese Communist Party (*Partido Comunista Português*; PCP) in Paris twice before the revolution, with meagre results due to the PCP’s reluctance.^{xxxv}

The Carnation Revolution, A New Way to Socialism in Western Europe?

The coup led by the Armed Forces Movement (*Movimento das Forças Armadas*; MFA)^{xxxvi} that put an end to the *Estado Novo* in Portugal on 25 April 1974 became almost immediately a social revolution.^{xxxvii} The French socialists realised then that Portugal could offer optimal conditions for moving towards socialism. Taking into account the socio-economic crisis and the backwardness of the Iberian country, they considered that ‘Portugal does not only need a political revolution. It also needs a social and economic revolution’.^{xxxviii} Moreover, the events in Portugal, where socialists and communists took part in the provisional government, presented the PSF with an exceptional opportunity to test their ideas on how to reach power and advance towards socialism.^{xxxix}

The possibilities that opened up in the Iberian country, together with the PSF’s ascendancy over the PS, led the French socialists to believe that they could internationally validate their domestic strategy. Thus, in the first stages of the revolution the French tried to promote the union of the left in Portugal.

They considered that only a union between socialists and communists could ensure a new way of marching towards socialism, a way in which freedom and democracy would be respected.^{xi} They also thought that only this union would be able to restrain the possible actions of the reactionary forces. Moreover, this strategy could benefit the Portuguese socialists, as they could take advantage of the organisational strength of the communists, while making the most of the almost fifty years of Salazar's anti-communist propaganda.^{xli} Furthermore, a powerful reason for the French to promote the union of the left in Portugal was the certainty that this strategy was the preferred one among Portuguese socialists. The PSF believed that the 'PS . . . playing to the full the union of the left, wishes, like PC[P], to subscribe to a dynamic relationship *à la française*, of which they have high expectations'.^{xlii} Finally, for the French socialists, spreading their ideological influence in Portugal would also mean an opportunity to strengthen their international position within the SI.

In June 1974 the leader of the PS, Mário Soares, invited Mitterrand to visit Portugal. It was the first important international visit to the new Portugal, and it afforded the PS project a good deal of publicity and leftist credibility. This was very important for the PS within the revolutionary context. As capitalism was generally associated with the old regime, a common trait of all of the Portuguese left-wing parties was anti-capitalism; being identified with French socialism was valuable for projecting the desired radical image.^{xliii} Indeed, several members of the PS executive emphasised their party's attachment to the French ideological trend.^{xliv} According to Vasco da Gama Fernandes, Mitterrand 'is an example for us . . . because he was able to unite the left in the common fight against the wrong kinds of progress'. In the same vein, Antonio Reis stated that 'Mitterrand is the secretary general of a socialist party whose ideological orientation is very close to ours. . . . Besides, Mitterrand is disposed towards working with us and he promises to ensure all necessary assistance from his party.'^{xlv}

Once in Lisbon Mitterrand employed explicitly anti-capitalist rhetoric in his speech at a socialist rally. He encouraged the Portuguese to march towards socialism, and he advised them to do this according to the French strategy – by uniting all the forces of the left.^{xlvi} After the rally the leaders of the PSF and PS held a meeting where they decided to strengthen the links between their parties. The French would give the Portuguese socialists political, ideological and technical support with the intention of allowing them to establish an alliance with the communists from which they could profit. They assumed that such an alliance would help both parties carry out a transition to socialism that would be able to contain the Portuguese conservatives and the reactionary forces. Then, if the calendar proposed by the MFA was respected, the PSF predicted that in the upcoming elections of 1975 the

PS would probably achieve better results than the PCP and could thereby lead the transition towards socialism in democracy.^{xlvi}

However, the revolutionary process changed after September 1974, when the Portuguese President António de Spínola resigned due to the social and political pressure against his plan to implement a presidential system. From October onwards the locus of the political struggle shifted to an intra-left conflict, with the main contenders being the PS, PCP and a divided MFA. The main issue at stake was no longer whether the objective of the revolution was socialism but rather what kind of socialism should be implanted. In December the PS held a Congress at which the party suffered a split: the section that was more committed to the union of the left separated from the PS.^{xlvi} In January 1975 the disagreements between socialists and communists intensified when the latter tried to pass a law to impose a single central union organisation under their control.^{xlvi}

The increasing tension between the PS and PCP was an obstacle to the strategy of the French socialists in Portugal. However, although PSF were concerned about the attitude of PCP,^l their public stance with regard to the revolution did not change. They downplayed the quarrel within the Portuguese left and maintained their support for its union.^{li} The problems between the PS and PCP arrived at a moment when the PSF was being criticised by the communists in France for being a centrist, reformist party that only sought electoral profit from the common programme of the left.^{lii} Moreover, at this point the PSF was redefining its strategy and its internal organisation at the Congress of Pau (January–February 1975), where the Centre for Socialist Education and Research (*Centre d'Etudes, de Recherches et d'Education Socialistes*: CERES), the faction of PSF most committed to the union of the left and rupture with capitalism, temporarily lost influence within the party.^{liii} The PSF tried to minimise domestic criticism by supporting the union of the left in Portugal and by omitting publicly their concerns about the PCP's attitude.

At the Congress of Pau, the PSF likewise sanctioned the decision to internationalise its struggle. The party delineated an international project of spreading ideological influence over the socialist parties of the Mediterranean, and more concretely in Southern Europe, where 'a particularly spirited solidarity inspired our relations with the Spanish and Portuguese socialists'.^{liv} It considered that 'this is the opportunity for the PS[F] to express [without hesitation] their political, moral and material support to the socialist and progressive parties of these countries'.^{lv}

However, the project of the PSF would face further obstacles in Portugal, as other issues embittered the relations between the PS and PCP, making mutual understanding increasingly difficult. One of these issues was holding the elections for the Constituent Assembly and their political significance.

The Portuguese socialists were very interested in these elections because they expected a favourable result, which could help them to gain control over the revolution. The communists, in turn, wanted to postpone the elections, arguing that after almost fifty years of a dictatorship, the Church and the right-wing parties still could easily manipulate the people, especially in the north of the country and in the islands. For this reason they felt that Portugal was not ready for completely free democratic elections.^{lvi} This issue became even more problematic after 11 March, when right-wing forces led by former President Spínola attempted a coup d'état. The attempt failed, and the most leftist elements of the MFA, with the support of the PCP, used it as an argument to strengthen their positions within the state apparatus with the creation of a Council of the Revolution. The banks and insurance companies were nationalised, and agrarian reform was begun with the expropriations of lands. A month later the MFA, again backed by PCP, used its strengthened position to make the participation of the political parties in the elections conditional on the signature of a pact that limited the competencies and autonomy of future governments. Although the PS was against this initiative, they signed the pact because of the moral and political legitimacy that a good electoral result could provide them.^{lvii}

In this context, Antoine Blanca, the PSF's expert on the Iberian Peninsula, visited Portugal from 21 to 22 March to assess the situation. He met privately with Soares, who expressed his concern about the intentions of the PCP, allied with the military, to implant a popular democracy in Portugal. According to Soares, the determination of the communists to do this made it very difficult for the PS to follow the strategy of the union of the left in Portugal^{lviii}.

The pessimistic view of the situation given by Soares caused concern in the PSF, as the possibility of Portugal drifting towards communism seemed real. Moreover, this implied that the Portuguese socialists were no longer willing to consider collaboration with the communists, which obliged the French to rethink their strategy in Portugal. This time, the response of the PSF leadership was to keep supporting the PS and to start criticising the PCP publicly. In their statements, they began to emphasise the socialists' commitment to democracy – a key concept without which socialism would make no sense for the leaders of the PSF – freedom and the revolution, while questioning the PCP's commitment to these same goals.^{lix}

However, events evolved quickly in Portugal. The elections to the Constituent Assembly were held on the 25 April 1975. The PS was the party with the most votes, achieving 37.9 per cent. The moderate Democratic People's Party (*Partido Popular Democrático*: PPD)^{lx} came second with 26.4 per cent, and the PCP came in third with 12.5 per cent. These positive results temporarily changed the PSF's interpretation of the Portuguese situation. Again, they considered that the alliance between socialists

and communists could be advisable and fruitful for the PS. They thought that after the electoral victory the PS could exploit their success and try to overcome Portugal's social, political and economic difficulties. The communists would have a part to play in this endeavour, but the PS would take the lead in the revolutionary process. Thus, the PS could still save both the revolution and democracy. The PSF was also aware that the future of the revolution depended on the acceptance of the electoral results by the military. Thus, they considered that the PS had to convince the MFA of their commitment to establishing a new society.^{lxi}

Building Southern European Socialism

While the situation in Portugal was perhaps the PSF's main area of international interest, they also reinforced their attention on neighbouring Spain in 1975. At that moment Franco was ill, and his imminent demise was clear to everyone, opening the door to political change in the country. The Spanish opposition were in a relatively similar situation to their counterparts in pre-revolutionary Portugal. There was a strong and well-organised communist party (*Partido Comunista de España*: PCE), and the Spanish socialists were weaker and factionalised, with the main party being the PSOE.^{lxii} Since its renovation in 1972,^{lxiii} PSOE had moved its executive committee from France to Spain and was in the process of renewing its ideology in a direction that aligned them closely to the PSF. In this context, the French saw the possibility to also spread their influence to Spain.

Between 1972 and 1974 the renovated PSOE displayed its interest in the model outlined by the PSF several times in its official newspaper. Initially, they viewed the model as an example that, when taken together with the Chilean socialist experience, showed that the process of international détente opened up new possibilities for the left in the West.^{lxiv} This was of interest to them as it seemed to legitimise collaboration with the PCE for overthrowing the Spanish dictatorship. However, after the dramatic downfall of Salvador Allende's government in Chile, and after the positive results of the PSF in the 1973 legislative and 1974 presidential elections of France, the PSOE more clearly defined its position regarding the union of the left. In 1974 the Spanish party considered this strategy to be an inspiring model that could be adapted to Spain to fight against the dictatorship and could allow the party to profit from the greater strength and grassroots support of the PCE. However, they did not want to repeat traumatic past experiences. Therefore, they focused more on the French experiment than on the Chilean one. Furthermore, they presented the French case as 'an experience practically without precedent',^{lxv} framing it differently to the popular fronts of the 1930s – which had left a lingering memory that warned against collaboration between socialists and communists in Spain. To

make this difference clear, the PSOE stressed the fact that the parties signatory to the ‘union of the left’ (*union de la gauche*) had kept their independence and autonomy. Although the PSOE was divided over the issue of how to relate to the communists,^{lxvi} at its thirteenth congress in exile (Suresnes, October 1974), it decided to cooperate with all other anti-Francoist forces, especially those on the left. Moreover, the congress granted the Executive Committee led by Felipe González total freedom to conduct the negotiations with the PCE.

François Mitterrand was the most significant international guest at the congress. He delivered a speech based on two key ideas: that class struggle was the engine of history, with socialists and communists being on the same side of this struggle, and that in the context of détente and economic international crisis it was necessary to internationalise the struggle of the socialist parties, which implied greater collaboration between the PSF and PSOE, as well as between these parties and others. He argued for greater collaboration between the Southern European socialist parties as follows:

it is essential to recover the issues and methods for the internationalisation of the our struggle. . . . We are training our militants with the aim that they will get to know you, that they will organise meetings with you. . . . We will help you . . . this includes many fields: the economic [field], which is always difficult, but possible, the organisational and the educational [fields], the technical [field], with public meetings: by the way, we have to organise public debates in 1975 . . . in which the leaders of Spanish, Portuguese, French and Italian socialism could meet, not with the aim to realise a, let’s say, Latin union, but because we are about to go through unique experiences, and it is in Europe where this new strategy of the union of the left has just been born, with the expectation that the socialists, who refuse to be included in social democracy . . . work for the total union of workers.^{lxvii}

Mitterrand’s speech galvanised the Spanish socialists, as he expressed his desire to build closer relations and a common strategy between the socialist parties of Southern Europe. Soon after the congress, in December 1974, the new leaders of the PSOE met with the leaders of the PSF in Paris. Both parties agreed to ‘intensify their relations in every field, especially in education and the exchange of information’. In the former field both parties had already collaborated before, with positive results according to the Spanish participants.^{lxviii} Furthermore, Mitterrand publicly showed his support for PSOE, considering it as ‘the only qualified representative of socialism in Spain’,^{lxix} which was very important for the Spanish party as it had to face competition from several other socialist groups.

Some weeks later, in January 1975, the parties began to collaborate on the education of the PSOE's members. Francisco Bustelo of the PSOE and Lionel Jospin of the PSF, who served as the training secretaries for the parties, met in Paris and decided to establish a copy service for both of their publications. They also decided that a member of the PSOE would spend two to eight days at the headquarters of the PSF. This would allow him or her to become familiar with how the French party worked in practice. The Spanish party also asked the French if they could provide a venue for the organisation of training courses in May and August, at which PSOE militants living in Spain and in exile could improve their theoretical awareness.^{lxx} The formation of the PSOE's cadres was urgent for the party leaders, as they feared that when the PSOE were legalised a crowd of opportunists could benefit from the democratic structures of the party and end up weakening its commitment to building socialism in Spain.^{lxxi}

Social Democracy versus Southern European Socialism

In the spring of 1975 the ideological division within the Socialist International that had been gathering momentum in the previous years found a front line in the Iberian Peninsula. The PS and PSOE became the battlefield for two different conceptualisations of democratic socialism: Southern European Socialism represented by the PSF, and social democracy represented by the SPD.^{lxxii} The French were well aware of this struggle,^{lxxiii} but they were rather surprised by the fierce reaction of the German social democrats to their attempt at strengthening bilateral and ideological links with the Spanish and Portuguese socialists. This, the French thought, brought about the 'hardening of the German Social Democratic party . . . with regard to the French PS'.^{lxxiv}

Despite the diversity of views existing among the Western countries on how to respond to the situation in Portugal,^{lxxv} from March on the West European social democrat parties and governments, working through both official and informal channels, intensified their collaboration in order to provide the leaders of the PS with support and guidance. Their aim was to promote the establishment of liberal democracy in Portugal and counteract the influence of the communists in the revolution. The Portuguese events concerned all of the Western powers,^{lxxvi} in Europe especially the Federal Republic of Germany, because the increasing influence of the PCP in the government – and the possible contagion effect on the other Southern European countries – put their understandings of détente^{lxxvii} at risk just months before the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) would take place in Helsinki.^{lxxviii} This led the German social democrats to try to influence the ideology of the PS, thereby preventing them from taking the ideological development and strategy of

the PSF as ‘universal remedies’ for Portugal.^{lxxxix} Similarly, early in May, the German social democrats decided to provide the PSOE with ‘all the support imaginable’ to help them to become the main party of the Spanish left, thus counterbalancing communist influence on the Spanish working class.^{lxxx} In the same vein, the Germans tried to counteract the French strategy of uniting the left in Spain.^{lxxxi}

At the same time, working in the opposite direction, Mitterrand set the Conference of the Socialist Parties of Southern Europe in motion. To prepare for the conference, he invited the leaders of the Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, Greek and Belgian socialist parties to spend a working weekend at his home in Latche, in southwestern France. The main objective of this informal meeting was to debate, exchange experiences and, if possible, reach a common stance on how to relate to the communists of Southern Europe. Thus, during the months that followed Iberian socialists were exposed to the conflicting influences of their European counterparts. They responded to this experience by using, adopting and adapting some of the conceptual and material transfers received from the European social democrats, as well as from the French.

The meeting of Southern European socialists in Latche took place on 23 and 24 May, and the discussions included national as well as international topics. However, the Portuguese situation was more extensively discussed, as the PS was finding it difficult to take advantage of its positive electoral results in Portugal, whereas the PCP was gaining influence in the state apparatus. On the first day in Latche, the Portuguese party representative Medeiros Ferreira let their Southern European fellow socialists know that in the current circumstances, the PS considered it impossible to establish a pact with the PCP. Moreover, the Portuguese socialists were concerned with the role that the military could play in the revolution after the elections, as a section of the MFA was reluctant to accept the political significance that the PS was ascribing to the electoral results.^{lxxxii} On 24 May Mário Soares arrived in Latche. In his presentation he held the PCP responsible for the failure of the union of the left in Portugal, and he emphasised that an agreement of this kind would be impossible because the ‘PCP wants to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat’. In this situation, the PS proposed an alternative way of action for reversing the situation that would be presented at the Portuguese Constituent Assembly. This would consist of the encouragement and protection of the private sector, the return of technocrats to the government and a request for European aid.^{lxxxiii} Soares thought that European support would be crucial for fighting for hegemony with the PCP. Considering Portugal’s critical economic situation, he argued that the socialists would have to ‘encourage private initiative, to facilitate the investments and to get credits from Western Europe’.^{lxxxiv} At the political level, ‘the military was sensitive to the pressures coming from Europe’. A further way of pressuring the PCP,

something in which the socialists of Southern Europe could be very helpful for the PS, was demanding that the communist parties of these European countries – especially the PCI^{lxxxv} and the PCF – refuse to support the PCP. He considered that ‘PCF is going to be upset [but they] cannot defend freedom here [in France] and Cunhal in Lisbon’.^{lxxxvi}

The Spanish situation was also touched upon during these two days of discussions. Felipe González presented the PSOE’s interpretation of the Spanish state of affairs to his colleagues. After explaining what he named ‘the insoluble crisis of the Spanish regime’, he remarked that there was a problem shared by all of the Spanish opposition: the socialists, communists and Christian democrats were each very factionalised. Moreover, the Basque and Catalan nationalists were part of the equation. According to González, ‘the conjunction of these currents was difficult’, especially because of the divergent tactics followed by the PSOE and PCE. The communists had reached an agreement with the right in the *Junta Democrática*,^{lxxxvii} while the PSOE thought that the political change had to come from the permanent mobilisation of the workers. The Spanish socialists were interested in some kind of agreement with the communists, but so far they had failed, the main reason being that the PCE always wanted to negotiate within the frame of the *Junta*. The PSOE rejected the *Junta*, not only because of its interclass composition but also because joining it would imply making a pact with the communists from a subaltern position.^{lxxxviii}

Regarding the options for the time after Franco, González foresaw three possible scenarios. The first one was the return to fascism and oppression. The deterioration of the situation in Portugal could favour the reactionaries in Spain. The second scenario would be controlled liberalisation led by Prince Juan Carlos. The third scenario would be democratic rupture, as praised by the opposition. Democratic rupture could entail a violent confrontation, which was not desirable. Thus, the PSOE needed to find a mediator within the regime in order to negotiate a way out of the dictatorship without violence. However, they were finding it difficult to find such a person.^{lxxxix} It is important to note that the French socialists could not help the Spanish with this issue, as they could not use governmental channels and they lacked contacts within the Spanish regime. This necessity gave the social democratic parties that were in government in Europe (especially the SPD) important leverage to influence the PSOE’s strategy and political behaviour from this moment onwards, as they were able to act as mediators between the Spanish socialists and the government.^{xc} Moreover, the economic, technical, political and diplomatic support that the German social democrats could offer via governmental channels, the party, trade unions and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation^{xcii} was much greater than the support that the PSF could provide.^{xcii}

The ideas presented by Soares and González made it difficult to establish a common Southern European socialist stance on the relations between socialists and communists. Moreover, the meeting of the socialists of Southern Europe provoked suspicion within the SI. Some member parties (social democrats from Central and Northern Europe, but also the Italian Social Democrat Party) viewed the reunion as an attempt to start a new internationalist line that threatened the ideological and organic unity of the organisation.^{xciii} The PSF denied this accusation, arguing that the statutes of the SI allowed regional consultations between parties and that the meeting at Latche ought to be understood in that context.^{xciv}

The End of the Portuguese Revolution. Possibilities and Limits of Southern European Socialism

In June 1975 the Portuguese Revolution entered a very turbulent phase commonly known as the ‘hot summer’ (*verão quente*). After the elections of April 1975 the PCP and MFA, based on the pact signed with the PS on 11 April, considered that the electoral results should not be reflected in the composition of the government, and that they were only valid for determining the composition of the Constituent Assembly. The PS, using their electoral legitimacy, claimed a leading role in the revolution and put pressure on their rivals by organising massive demonstrations across the country. Later, the occupation of the socialist newspaper *República* by the workers’ committee, and the lack of satisfactory solutions given to this problem by the Council of the Revolution, led the socialist ministers to resign from government in July 1975.^{xcv}

During this strained situation between July and November, it is possible to perceive an important shift in priorities and discourse regarding Portugal within the PSF. If previously the French had been promoting the union of the left with the final goal of ensuring that the socialist revolution would follow a democratic path, now the priority of the PSF coincided to a greater extent with the objective of European social democracy – to establish a representative democratic system in Portugal on the basis of the electoral results from April. It was on this basis that the French supported the path to socialism in Portugal.

This change was caused by a combination of three factors: the tumultuous development of the revolution, Soares’s rejection of the union of the left in private conversations and European social democratic involvement in Portugal. However, in public as well as internally, the PSF justified this change by exclusively blaming it on the Portuguese communists. From the perspective of the leadership of the PSF, the PCP had been responsible for breaking with the idea of the union of the

left by attempting to monopolise the revolution. In these circumstances, ‘who can reproach [the PS] over its refusal to negotiate in such a weak position? Had [the PS] any other alternative than calling upon the masses, as apparently the scrutiny of 25th April was considered invalid?’^{xcvi} Acknowledging the limits of their own strategy in the Portuguese circumstances, the French position was now less opposed to that of the European social democrats.

Between August and September the main leaders of the SI (Harold Wilson, Mário Soares, Bruno Kreisky, Willy Brandt, Helmut Schmidt, François Mitterrand, Joop den Uyl, Trygve Bratteli, Anker Jørgensen and Kalevi Sorsa) met in Stockholm and then in London,^{xcvii} creating the Committee of Friendship and Solidarity with Democracy and Socialism in Portugal. This committee’s aim was to coordinate action among the European socialist and social democrat parties in order to avoid a communist takeover in Portugal. Its most immediate objectives were to work towards the establishment of a democratic regime in Portugal, the restoration of basic freedoms (especially for the press and trade unions) and to fight against Portuguese international isolation. It was also agreed that the social democrats should handle European public opinion, explaining their activities as far as they could, to create a favourable atmosphere in support of democracy in Portugal. Thus, they also wanted to avoid accusations of interference in Portuguese internal affairs, which after the CSCE was an especially important issue.^{xcviii}

After these meetings the strategy of the PSF with regard to Portugal changed. Following the objectives agreed at the meeting in Stockholm, the National Secretariat of the PSF sent a circular to its militants informing them about the new strategy to follow in Portugal. They were requested to:

not get involved in any common action with other formations of the left over the Portuguese affair. . . . Equally, we ask you not to sign common texts [and] not to have any public common meetings, or anything similar, with the other formations that are signatories to the common programme. . . . We would like the socialist federations [that] demonstrate on the Portuguese situation. . . . [to] insist on the following terms: the reference to universal suffrage should not be excluded, even in a revolutionary process such as the one going on in Portugal. The revolution should be put at the service of the democratic principles: political pluralism, freedom of expression, freedom of reunion, etc. . . . We socialists think that respect for these values, even during the development of the revolutionary phase, is indispensable. So too is the recognition of the irreversibility of the results of the elections to the Constituent Assembly.^{xcix}

The Portuguese events provoked greater agitation than ever within the French party during August, and the PSF leadership stopped supporting the union of the left in Portugal if it was not to be achieved

on socialist terms. The PSF's National Secretariat sent updates to the federations and the party secretary for propaganda about the strategy to follow. A new circular was sent with more refined instructions at the end of August. The leadership of the PSF built a basic argument that was to be followed and adopted by the whole party. Following along the abovementioned lines, it consisted of publicly stressing the PCP's sectarianism and anti-unionist behaviour, and emphasising that this not only made the union between the PS and PCP difficult but also opened the door to reactionary sentiments. Therefore, if the PSF was going to refer to the union of the left, this would be carried out bearing in mind that 'it can only be achieved on the base of democratic principles and with respect for universal suffrage', which meant that the union should be led by the PS. Instead of socialism, 'the content of the union of the left in Portugal has to be democracy'.^c

On 19 September 1975 the Sixth Provisional Government was established in Portugal; this moment is considered to be the beginning of the end of the revolution. The intervention of the moderate faction of the MFA facilitated the creation of a new government that reflected April's electoral results. The PS held five ministries, the PPD two and the PCP only one. Non-communist military officers and technocrats held the rest of the ministries. Shortly after the creation of the new government the Western powers coordinated their responses to the Portuguese events, and the United States and the EEC conceded economic aid to Portugal, conditional to the development of a liberal democracy. They also publicly supported a Portuguese request to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for balance of payments aid.^{ci}

On 4 and 5 October the PSF held a debate on Portugal. The directive committee of the party unanimously adopted a resolution. It recommended that Portugal keep the *acquis* of the revolution and 'hoped that the PS would contribute to healing the relations between the parties of the left, creating the conditions of development of the union of the popular forces and ensuring the efficacy of the governmental coalition'.^{cii} The leadership of the PSF was aware that the PS would probably put an end to the revolution. However, they wondered: 'do we have the right to [question] the authenticity of the PS?' The answer they came to was negative. They thought that the PS represented 'the first manifestation in which a PS has reaffirmed its autonomy in a revolutionary situation without succumbing to the social democrat temptation, or to crypto-communist deviation'. Moreover, they considered that 'by itself', the PS 'had made the PCP back down without favouring the counter-revolution'. Accordingly, the PSF's support for the PS 'was largely justified'.^{ciii} If this was the opinion of the majority of the party's leadership, the CERES was very critical of both the PS and the leadership of the PSF and publicly expressed its opinion.^{civ} The CERES thought that 'the patronage [exerted by H. Schmidt and H. Wilson] made the Portuguese PS appear as the vector of a "social

democratic” project, which in the current Portuguese conditions means the restoration of capitalism’.^{cv}

The PSOE, the PSF and the Continuation of Southern European Socialism

The Portuguese Revolution seemed to show the limitations of collaboration between socialists and communists at a point when marching towards socialism became a real possibility. These events raised questions among Southern European socialists about the democratic credibility of the communist parties that were labelled euro-communists. Moreover, in 1975 a secret document of the PCF from 1972 was published,^{cvi} in which the leader of the party, Georges Marchais, stated that the PCF’s programme was superior to the Common Programme of the left, and that his party would work to make its own programme prevail. Although the PSF did not overreact to the publication of this document,^{cvii} the credibility of the communists was undermined, and relations between socialists and communists became especially uneasy. The Portuguese experience also affected how the Spanish socialists perceived the ideologically renewed eurocommunists – it made the leaders of the PSOE suspicious and even more careful about establishing pacts with the PCE.^{cviii}

As we saw above, the leaders of the PSF and PSOE began to collaborate over the training of PSOE’s militants as early as January 1975. Four months later they worked together to set the Conference of Southern European Socialism in motion. However, what had begun as a promising collaboration between two ideologically and geographically close parties lost momentum after the Latche meeting. From the summer of 1975 onwards the relations between the PSOE and PSF lessened in intensity and even deteriorated, in part due to the growing influence of the SPD on the leaders of the PSOE, but also due to the inconsistency of the PSF’s support for the Spanish party.

The impact of the German support for the PSOE is noticeable in the political behaviour of the Spanish party from the summer 1975 onwards. Some effects of this support were the PSOE’s increasingly amenable stance to negotiate with the regime and its abandonment of the idea of allying with the PCE. However, the PSOE still needed to enhance its left-wing image and deal with the dominant communists. After privileged relations were established between the SPD and PSOE, the socialists began to be criticised by the rest of the socialist opposition for coming close to reformist social democracy and having preferential treatment from the government.^{cix} This ‘attempt to distort and defame the PSOE’ concerned the party greatly.^{cx} It tried to counter these attacks by, amongst other things, publicly emphasising its ideological affinity with the French socialists.^{cx}

However, bilateral relations between the French and the Spanish socialists declined. This deterioration was related to the SPD's desire to prevent the germination of the ideas of the PSF among the Spanish socialists, but there were also other reasons. During the whole of 1975 the PSF tactically employed its relations with Santiago Carrillo, the leader of the PCE. They paid as much public attention to him and other Spanish socialist parties as they did to the PSOE, if not more, which provoked the PSOE's anger. The Spanish explained: 'we do not think that this is a very clear demonstration of the solidarity among socialists . . . perhaps we are still a little QUIJOTE',^{cxii} meaning idealistic and naïve. The inconsistent French attitude towards the PSOE can be plausibly explained by observing the complex situation of the French socialists, who were internally divided and also confronted by the PCF as a result of the Portuguese events. In this situation, paying special attention to the Spanish communists was instrumental to the PSF. It was a way for the French party to minimise the criticism from the CERES and PCF for having overtly supported the Portuguese PS against the PCP in Portugal. Furthermore, giving visibility and enhancing the euro-communist moderate line advocated by Carrillo was a way to criticise the PCF, which had publicly supported the 'Stalinist' PCP during the Revolution, unlike the PCE.

After the death of Franco on 20 November 1975 the PSF tried to relaunch cooperation between the parties of Southern Europe by organising the first Conference of Southern European Socialist Parties in Paris (24 and 25 January 1976).^{cxiii} The initiative was again welcomed by the PSOE. The Spanish socialists were interested in the public repercussions of this meeting and in confirming their attachment to the Southern European socialist label.^{cxiv} The Portuguese, on the other hand, welcomed the initiative but they did not engage with it as closely as the Spanish, as is shown by Mário Soares's absence.

This was the most ambitious attempt by the PSF to establish a new ideological trend within the SI. Their goals for this conference were as follows:

- a) to enhance the originality of the socialist strategies in the south of Europe, underlying the points of strength of the French strategy (rupture with the capitalist system, union of the Left, common programme); b) to implement a unitary dynamic in the south of Europe, involving the trade unions that could play a useful role in finding a meeting point that could be 'European workers and the crisis'; c) to design a foreign policy . . . [that could be titled] 'a socialist policy for the Mediterranean'; d) to consider that on these bases, a dialogue with the social democracy should be opened.^{cxv}

The attempt to create this international trend at this precise moment was very interesting to the French because after the publication of the Tindemans Report the future of the EC seemed to be moving towards the greater political, economic and social integration of the member states. If the competencies of a democratically elected European Parliament were going to be strengthened in the near future, the Conference of the Southern European Socialists could be significant for initiating a debate from a strong position against the social democrats on the ideas of socialism, the union of the left and the building of a social Europe.^{cxvi} The French considered that ‘it is important popularise the union of the left in Europe and in the world and to engage the debate with Northern Europe clearly on this point’.^{cxvii}

However, five days before the beginning of the Conference there was a Bureau meeting of the SI in Helsingør (Denmark), at which all of the socialist leaders of Western Europe discussed the relations between socialists and communists.^{cxviii} The discussion was heated and Mitterrand clashed with Helmut Schmidt. The French argued that the only way to build a socialist society in freedom was by making a pact with the communists. Moreover, Mitterrand considered that the socialists could only reach government in the south of Europe through such pacts. Schmidt, in turn, accused the parties of Southern Europe of putting European unity and the politico-military equilibrium of the West in danger by making a pact with the communists. This meeting set the tone for the development of the Conference of the Southern European Socialists.

Once in Paris the PSOE had to present the most controversial and heated topic of the Conference: the relations between socialists and communists. The PSOE’s secretary of press and information Alfonso Guerra presented a paper titled ‘Coordinating Action Between the Different Forces of the Left in the South of Europe’. He argued that despite the problems for the union of the left in the Southern European countries, ‘the union is necessary, now more than ever’. His reasoning was that in order to advance to socialism, ‘it is not [enough] to gain only 51 per cent of the vote in an election. It is necessary to have the support of multiple layers of society to sustain the political project proposed by the left.’ In order to carry out this unification project, the PSOE considered collaboration between the following elements to be indispensable: ‘a) the socialist parties of the different countries; b) between socialists and communists; c) with [other] progressive forces (Christians, radicals, etc.); d) with the trade unions’. Consequently, in order to advance in this direction, the PSOE proposed regular meetings between the socialist parties of Southern Europe.^{cxix}

The text presented by the PSOE was congruent with the ideological development of the party since its renovation in 1972–4. Nevertheless, to get the full picture of the PSOE’s position at this

Conference, González's speech at the inauguration has to be taken into consideration, as he added nuance to some of Guerra's statements. First of all, González tried to make it clear that the Conference did not imply any attempt at breaking up the relations between the Southern European socialist parties and the Northern European social democrat parties. In fact, he tried to build bridges, stating that the aim of all of these parties was to build a socialist and democratic Europe, which could only be attained through 'the decisive confluence of the socialist and social democrat parties'. Regarding the union of the left in Spain, González developed and nuanced Guerra's statements, highlighting Spain's specific position of being under a dictatorship. An agreement with all of the democratic forces was an overriding necessity for his party but only until democracy was reached. Thus, González postponed any decision on the union of the left in Spain until democracy had arrived. In the current circumstances he considered that an exclusive union between socialists and communists in Spain would not be possible because of the reaction that it could provoke among the right-wing, which 'enjoys a very solid support from the army'.^{cxx}

If we are to evaluate the significance of the conference in terms of the development of a common socialist strategy to relate to the communists, or to develop a new path towards socialism, the results were disappointing. In all of the presentations at the conference the theoretical need for the union of the left was acknowledged to a greater or lesser extent, but it only existed in France, and the specific situations of the other socialist parties in their own countries seemed to make it very difficult to achieve a common stance on this issue. On top of all this, there was hostility within the SI, aroused by the creation of a new socialist brand that was favourable to the union of the left.

However, if we are to evaluate the significance of the conference in terms of gaining international legitimacy and enhancing the electoral image of the parties involved, it could be considered a success, especially if we take into account that the parties tried to keep the Southern European socialist brand alive, holding a second conference in Madrid in May 1977,^{cxxi} and, after some years of interruption, other conferences in the early 1980s. The nature of the event changed completely, however. The relations between socialists and communists had been the reason for the first conference, but in Madrid the union of the left was not mentioned at all. The main idea of the Madrid conference was linking democracy and socialism, which was carried out by emphasising and developing the concept of 'self management' (*autogestión*). In the 1980s the disagreements regarding tactic and strategy between the parties involved were so great that they could only agree on focusing on international policy, which they claimed should be guided by the vague principles of 'peace, security and human rights'.^{cxxii}

Finally, it is difficult to assess the relevance that the creation of the Southern European socialist trend had for rebalancing the forces within the left in the region. However, the fact that these parties kept alive the Southern European socialist label until 1981 – always celebrating a conference immediately before an election in one of the Southern European countries –^{cxiii} and that all of them went from being organisationally and/or electorally weaker than the communists in the early-1970s to being dominant in the early-1980s, suggests that building Southern European socialism might have been a relevant factor contributing to this rebalancing of forces. For the PSF, the creation of this trend helped them to legitimise its domestic strategy internationally. For the PS and PSOE, this label was useful for building a leftist identity, which was important for them in the context of competition for the hegemony within the left. Furthermore, it could be argued that the creation of this trend to a certain extent triggered the reaction of German social democracy, which increased its support to the Iberian socialist parties immediately after the first meeting of Southern European socialist parties in Latche. The combination of these two factors surely contributed greatly to rebalancing the forces within the Iberian left.

Conclusion

During 1974–6, the crucial years during which the Iberian dictatorships came to an end, the Spanish and Portuguese socialists were very attentive to the ideological guidance of the PSF. This was because the French party offered an interesting example of competitive collaboration with a stronger communist party, as well as an ideological line that respected democracy and freedom but aimed to break with capitalism and implant socialism. At the same time, the PSF actively promoted a new ideological line among the Iberian socialists. This Southern European Socialism held the core idea of the union of the left. Although the PSOE and PS initially welcomed this idea, the development of the Portuguese revolution in the context of Cold War détente showed the limitations to applying this strategy outside France, as the PSF acknowledged. Furthermore, the suspicion that was created among European social democrats by the French attempt to patronise the Iberian socialists, and the decisive support that member parties of the SI, such as the SPD, provided to the PS and PSOE in order to strengthen their moderate line prevented this strategy from being further considered.

Thus, already in 1975 the Portuguese and Spanish socialists rejected the French way of competing against the communists and opted for alternative ways to establish the hegemony among the left, supported by the main European social democrat parties. However, although they did not follow the strategy of their French counterparts, their association with the PSF – especially the radical image

that Southern European Socialism could provide – was relevant to them. At different moments during the Iberian transitions, the Spanish and Portuguese socialists sought to publicly highlight their closeness to the PSF in order to counteract the criticism coming from other compatriot left-wing parties for being excessively moderate.

Finally, this article has not only shown the relevance and limits of the collaboration between these parties, it has also demonstrated that the party leaders had the possibility to choose alternatives that differed from the path promoted by the Northern social democrats. Despite the several national (not included here, but fully discussed in the literature quoted in this article) and international constraints that they found for developing the political plans designed in the early 1970s, during the transitions there were different ways of action and models available to them that eventually were not chosen. This implies that the path that they decided to take was neither natural nor inevitable.

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ⁱ Although other parties were part of this trend (at different moments the Belgian, Italian and Greek socialist parties were associated to Southern European Socialism) this article exclusively focuses on the French and the Iberian socialist parties, as their relations, given the context of regime changes in the Iberian Peninsula, were especially relevant for the creation of the Southern European Socialist trend.

ⁱⁱ Placed at the *Centre d'Archives Socialistes* (CAS), *Fondation Jean-Jaurès* (FJJ), Paris.

ⁱⁱⁱ Placed at the *Fundación Pablo Iglesias* (FPI), Alcalá de Henares.

^{iv} See, for example, Mario Del Pero et al, *Democrazie. L'Europa Meridionale e la Fine delle Dittature* (Milano: Le Monnier, 2010); Mario Del Pero, 'A European solution for a European Crisis. The international implications of Portugal's Revolution', *Journal of European Integration History*, 15, 1 (2009), 15–34.

^v Antonio Muñoz Sánchez, *El amigo alemán. El SPD y el PSOE de la dictadura a la democracia* (Barcelona: RBA Libros, 2012); Antonio Muñoz Sánchez, 'The Friedrich Ebert Foundation and the Spanish Socialists during the Transition to Democracy, 1975–1982', *Contemporary European History*, 25, 1 (2016), 285–314; Ana Monica Rôla da Fonseca, 'The Federal Republic of Germany and the Portuguese Transition to Democracy (1974–1976)', *Journal of European Integration History* 15, 1 (2009), 35–56; Ana Monica Rôla da Fonseca, 'Apoio da social-democracia alemã à democratização portuguesa (1974–1975)', *Transição Democrática em Portugal. Leer Historia*, 63

(2012), 93–108; David Castaño, ‘“A Practical Test in Détente”: International Support for the Socialist Party in the Portuguese Revolution’, *Cold War History*, 15, 1 (2015), 1–26; António Simões do Paço, ‘El gobierno Wilson 1974–1976. Europa y la Revolución Portuguesa’, *Ayer. Revista de Historia Contemporánea*, 99 (2015), 101–22; Juliet Antunes Sablosky, *O PS e a transição para a democracia. Relações com os partidos socialistas europeus* (Lisboa: Editorial Notícias, 2000); António Simões do Paço, ‘Friends in High Places – O Partido Socialista e a « Europa conosco »’, in Raquel Varela, ed., *Revolução ou Transição? História e memória da Revolução dos Cravos* (Lisboa: Bertrand, 2012), 117–38; Pilar Ortuño Anaya, *Los socialistas europeos y la transición española (1959–1977)* (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2005).

^{vi} Guillaume Devin, *L’Internationale Socialiste. Histoire et Sociologie du Socialisme International (1945–1990)* (Paris: Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1993). For a comprehensive history of the European social democracy see: Donald Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century* (London: I.B.Tauris, 1996). Although it covers chronologically only until the mid 1970s, see also: Jacques Droz, *Histoire Générale du Socialisme. Tome IV: De 1945 à nos jours* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1978).

^{vii} I am referring to the ongoing doctoral thesis of Stine Bonsaksen: ‘Democratisation by exclusion? Scandinavian Social Democracy and the Iberian transition to democracy 1974–1986’, NTNU.

^{viii} Fadi Kassem, ‘Choosing a foreign policy for French Socialists. The case of the democratic revolution in Portugal (1974–1981)’, *Zeitgeschichte* 2, 40 (March/April 2013), 87–106; Alan Granadino, ‘Fertile soil for Socialism or Communist threat? The Carnation Revolution through the eyes of the French Socialists’, in “*Un problema difícil*” *La Rivoluzione dei Garofani vista dalla sinistra europea*, eds. Matteo Albanese and Annarita Gori, *Ricerche Storiche*, 1 (2016), 61–70; Antonio Peciccia, ‘Mario Soares e la transizione portoghese, tra dinamiche internazionali e lotte di potere (1974–1976)’, *Itinerari di ricerca storica*, XXVIII, 1 (2014), 89–118.

^{ix} Bernard E. Brown, ed., *Eurocommunism & Eurosocialism. The Left Confronts Modernity* (New York and London: Cyrco Press, 1979); Tom Gallagher and Allan M. Williams, *Southern European socialism: parties, elections, and the challenge of government* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1989); James Kurth and James Petras, eds., *Mediterranean Paradoxes. The Policies and Social Structure of Southern Europe* (Providence: Berg, 1993); James Petras, ‘The Rise and Decline of Southern European Socialism,’ *New Left Review* 146 (Jul./Aug. 1984), 37–52.

^x José M. Magone, ‘The internationalisation of the Portuguese socialist party, 1973–2003’, *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 6, 3 (2005): 491–516; Antonio Peciccia, ‘Mario Soares e la transizione portoghese, tra dinamiche internazionali e lotte di potere (1974–1976)’, *Itinerari di Ricerca Storica*, XXVIII, 1 (2014), 89–118.

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- ^{xi} Christian Salm, *Transnational Socialist Networks in the 1970s. European Community Development Aid and Southern Enlargement* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).
- ^{xii} Bernd Rother, 'Exporting Democracy? European Social Democrats and the European Community's Southern Enlargement', in *Europe in a Globalising World. Global Challenges and European Responses in the "long" 1970s*, ed. Claudia Hiepel (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2014), 185–200.
- ^{xiii} Michele Di Donato, 'The Cold War and Socialist Identity: The Socialist International and the Italian 'Communist Question' in the 1970s', *Contemporary European History*, 24 (2015), 193–211.
- ^{xiv} Fadi Kassem, 'Le Parti socialiste français et le socialisme d'Europe du Sud dans les années 1970: à la recherche d'un «compromis» eurosocialiste. Une nouvelle approche de l'histoire du Parti socialiste français (PSF)', *Matériaux pour l'histoire de notre temps*, 119–120 (2016/1), 11–6.
- ^{xv} Helen Graham, 'The Spanish Popular Front and the Civil War', in *The Popular Front in Europe*, ed. Helen Graham and Paul Preston (Houndmills and London: Macmillan Press, 1987), 106–130.
- ^{xvi} For example, the Italian, French and Spanish communist parties.
- ^{xvii} Niall Ferguson, Charles S. Maier, Erez Manela and Daniel J. Sargent (eds.), *The Shock of the Global. The 1970s in Perspective*, (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2010).
- ^{xviii} In the early 1970s there was social democrat presence in the governments of Sweden, the Federal Republic of Germany, Austria, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands and the UK. See: Sassoon, *One Hundred Years*.
- ^{xix} David S. Bell and Byron Criddle, *The French Socialist Party. The Emergence of a Party of Government* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); George Arthur Coddington and Safran William, *Ideology and politics: the Socialist Party of France* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979).
- ^{xx} On the introduction and development of the concept *autogestion* in France see: Georgi, Frank, *L'autogestion en chantier. Les gauches françaises et le « modèle » yougoslave (1948–1981)* (Nancy : Arbres bleus éditions, 2018).
- ^{xxi} In July 1972 PSF signed the Common Programme of the Left with the Communist Party and the Left-Radicals.
- ^{xxii} Hugues Portelli, 'Le Parti Socialiste et l'Internationale Socialiste (1971–1981)', in *L'Internationale Socialiste*, ed. Hugues Portelli (Paris: Les Éditions Ouvrières, 1983), 137–146. Also see: Michel Dreyfus, *L'Europe des Socialistes* (Paris: Editions Complexe, 1991), 269–289.
- ^{xxiii} Mitterand explained at the Vienna Congress of the SI in 1972 that PSF aimed to use the union of the Left to conquer three million voters out of the five million that voted for PCF. See: André

Donneur, *L'alliance fragile. Socialistes et communistes français (1922–1983)* (Montreal: Editions Nouvelle Optique, 1983), 258.

^{xxiv} Sablosky, *O PS e a transição*, 38. Also: Michele Di Donato, 'Un socialismo per l'Europa del Sud? Il PS di François Mitterrand e il coordinamento dei partiti socialisti dell'Europa meridionale', in *Nazioni e Narrazioni tra l'Italia e l'Europa, Storia Contemporanea*, ed. Michelangelo di Giacomo, AnnaRita Gori, Tommaso Nencioni and Gregorio Sorgonà, 16 (Apr. 2013), 240.

^{xxv} Christelle Flandre, *Socialisme ou social-démocratie? Regards croisés français allemands, 1971–1981* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2006).

^{xxvi} There are two interpretations regarding the renovation of PSOE. The first one, held by the historian Santos Juliá, implies that PSOE was newly founded between 1972 and 1974, using the Spanish word *refundación* to term this process. See: Santos Juliá, *Los socialistas en la política española, 1879–1982* (Madrid: Taurus, 1997). The second one, defended by the historian Abdón Mateos, argues that it is more accurate to use the term *renovación*, which means renovation, to name the process experienced by PSOE in the early 1970s. See: Abdón Mateos, *El PSOE contra Franco. Continuidad y renovación del socialismo español, 1953–74* (Madrid: EPI, 1993). Also see: Abdón Mateos, 'La transición del PSOE durante los años setenta', in *Historia de la Transición en España. Los inicios del proceso democratizador*, ed. Rafael Quirosa–Cheyrouze y Muñoz (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2007), 285–299. In this work I have adopted the latter term considering that the renovation of PSOE implied change without breaking with the past of the party.

^{xxvii} On the split of PSOE and the recognition of the renewed faction by the SI see: Ortuño, *Los socialistas*.

^{xxviii} In Spanish *ruptura democrática*. Basically, the socialists understood this concept as the rejection of any kind of reformist alternative proposed by the regime.

^{xxix} Pierre Guidoni and Felipe González, *Entretiens sur le socialisme en Espagne* (Paris: Tema, 1976), 40.

^{xxx} On the ideological development of PSOE during the Spanish transition to democracy, see: Santos Juliá, 'The ideological conversion of the leaders of PSOE, 1976–1979', in *Élites and Power in Twentieth-Century Spain*, eds. Frances Lannon and Paul Preston (New York: Clarendon Press–Oxford, 1990), 269–285; Juan Antonio Andrade Blanco, *El PCE y el PSOE en (la) transición. La evolución ideológica de la izquierda durante el proceso de cambio político* (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 2012).

^{xxxi} Susana Martins, *Socialistas na Oposição ao Estado Novo* (Lisboa: Editorial Notícias, 2005).

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- ^{xxxii} On the ideological renewal of PS especially see: António Reis, 'O Partido Socialista na revolução, no poder e na oposição. Da dialéctica com o projecto nacional-militar à dialéctica com o eanismo', in *O Partido Socialista e a Democracia*, ed. Vitalino Canas (Oeiras: Celta, 2005), 94–127.
- ^{xxxiii} 'Declaração de Princípios e Programa do Partido Socialista', (1973), 6. Fundação Mário Soares (FMS), CasaComum.org, Disponível HTTP: http://hdl.handle.net/11002/fms_dc_80123 (2018-12-12)
- ^{xxxiv} Relatório de Mário Soares ao Congresso da Acção Socialista Portuguesa, Construir uma Nova Vida, Destruir o Sistema (1973), 44. 'Construir uma nova vida/Destruir o sistema/Por um Partido Socialista forte combativo e eficaz', FMS, CasaComum.org, available from: http://hdl.handle.net/11002/fms_dc_80122
- ^{xxxv} Reis, 'O Partido Socialista na revolução', 63.
- ^{xxxvi} In Portuguese: *Movimento da Forças Armadas*.
- ^{xxxvii} Already in May, the number of strikes and the occupation of houses, factories and lands increased enormously. See: Pedro Ramos Pinto, *Lisbon rising. Urban social movements in the Portuguese Revolution, 1974–1975* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2013); Maria de Lourdes Santos, Marinús Pires de Lima, Vítor Matias Ferreira, *O 25 de Abril e as Lutas Sociais nas Empresas*, 3 vol (Porto: Afrontamento, 1976); Constantino Piçarra, 'A reforma agrária no sul de Portugal (1975)', in *Revolução ou Transição? História e memória da Revolução dos Cravos*, ed. Raquel Varela (Lisboa: Bertrand, 2012), 75–96.
- ^{xxxviii} Claude Fuzier, 'Le mai portugais', *L'unité*, 109, 5 Mar. 1974, 22–3.
- ^{xxxix} Kassem, 'Choosing a foreign policy for French Socialists'.
- ^{xl} This was the idea of the faction of PSF called CERES.
- ^{xli} See: Granadino, 'Fertile soil for Socialism'.
- ^{xlii} Maurice Fabien, 'Lisbonne la rouge', *L'unité*, 110, 10–6 May 1974, 26.
- ^{xliii} Alan Granadino, 'Between radical rhetoric and political moderation: The Portuguese PS and its international networks in the Carnation Revolution', eds. Marianne Egger de Campo and Christian Fleck, *The End of Social Democracy? The moderate left since 1945, its transformation and outlook in Europe*, special issue, *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaften – Austrian Journal of Historical Studies*, 1 (2018), 85–110.
- ^{xliv} Soares wrote an extensive article on the Congress of Epinay in which he showed his admiration for the renovation of the French Socialism and for their attempt to rebalance the equilibrium of forces in the left by negotiating from equal to equal with PCF. See: Mário Soares, 'Congresso da Unidade', 15/06/1971, Arquivo Mário Soares, FMS, (1971), 'O Congresso da Unidade'. Available from: <http://www.casacomum.org/cc/visualizador?pasta=00034.002.003>

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- ^{xlv} Both quotations are from: ‘Qual o significado político da vinda de Mitterrand ao nosso país?’, *Portugal Socialista*, 6, 8 Jun. 1974.
- ^{xlvi} ‘Socialismo: a única resposta para o mundo que nos rodeia’, *Portugal Socialista*, 6, 8 Jun. 1974.
- ^{xlvi} 450RI1, Manuscript titled Entrevue avec Crespo. CAS, FJJ.
- ^{xlviii} The split led to the foundation of *Movimento Socialista Popular*, later called *Frente Socialista Popular*, led by Manuel Serra.
- ^{xlx} Kenneth Maxwell, *The Making of Portuguese Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995)
- ^l 450RI1, Antoine Blanca, Sur la situation au Portugal. CAS, FJJ.
- ^{li} ‘Portugal: Pour un programme comun’, *L’unité*, 143, 31 Jan. 1975, 18.
- ^{lii} See: Bell and Criddle, *The French Socialist Party*, 84–8; David S. Bell and Byron Criddle, *The French Communist Party in the Fifth Republic* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 178–9; Richard W. Johnson, *The Long March of the French Left* (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1981), 167–174.
- ^{liii} Bell and Criddle, *The French Socialist Party*.
- ^{liv} ‘L’action internationale du Parti socialiste’, *Le poing et la rose*, 36, Jan. 1975, 5.
- ^{lv} ‘Pour assumer la dimension internationale de la lutte des classes’, *Le poing et la rose*, 34, Dec. 1974, 7.
- ^{lvi} On the stance of the PCP with regard to the elections see: Raquel Varela, *A história do PCP na revolução dos cravos* (Lisboa: Bertrand, 2011), 205.
- ^{lvii} Reis, Antonio, ‘O Partido Socialista na revolução’, 73–4.
- ^{lviii} 450RI1, Carnet de route: 48 heures avec les socialistes portugais, mars 1975, Antoine Blanca. CAS, FJJ.
- ^{lix} See for example: ‘Le parti socialiste portugais est le garant de la démocratie déclare M. François Mitterrand’, *Le Monde*, 22 Mar. 1975.
- ^{lx} *Partido Popular Democrático*.
- ^{lxi} 450RI1, Analyse du resultat des élections portugaises (25 avril 1975). CAS, FJJ.
- ^{lxii} On the situation of the Spanish Socialist opposition before the death of Franco see: Abdón Mateos, ‘Del «laberinto» socialista al «partido de la transición»’, in *Los partidos en la Transición. Las organizaciones políticas en la construcción de la democracia española*, ed. Rafael Quirosa-Cheyrouze y Muñoz (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2013), 221–234.

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- ^{lxiii} The renovation of the party took place between 1972 and 1974. See: Richard Gillespie, *The Spanish Socialist Party. A History of Factionalism* (Oxford and New York: Clarendon Press, 1989); Juliá, *Los socialistas*.
- ^{lxiv} See for instance: ‘Coloquio sobre Checoslovaquia’, *El Socialista*, Dec. 1972, 8.; R.R., ‘PSOE. Actividades en el exterior. Sección de París’, *El Socialista*, 2, 28 Jun. 1973, 5; ‘Política Internacional. Francia’, *El Socialista*, Jan. 1973, 4.
- ^{lxv} ‘La oposición en Francia’, *El Socialista*, Apr. 1973, 4.
- ^{lxvi} See for example: F.P de Alicante, ‘Aclarando conceptos’, *El Socialista*, 25, first half of Jul. 1974, 3; Márquez, F., ‘Nuestra opción’, *El Socialista*, 24, second half of Jun. 1974, 2.
- ^{lxvii} ‘Palabras de Mitterrand, primer secretario del Partido Socialista Francés, al XIII Congreso: Hay que internacionalizar la lucha’, *El Socialista*, 29, second half of Oct. 1974, 2–3.
- ^{lxviii} AE-628-8, Secretaría de Formación del Militante, Cursos realizados en 1974 (exterior), FPI.
- ^{lxix} 424 RI2, Communiqué du secrétariat international du PS, 04/12/1974. CAS, FJJ. This document has already been quoted in Ortuño, *Los socialistas europeos*, 161.
- ^{lxx} 424RI1, Note à Lionel, 10/01/1975. CAS, FJJ.
- ^{lxxi} 300-C-6, Situación política desde 1970 a 1975, PSOE’s Historical Archive, FPI.
- ^{lxxii} In general terms, as there were tendencies within the German party, such as the youth section Jusos, that were to the left of the leadership of the party.
- ^{lxxiii} Flandre, *Socialisme ou social-démocratie?*
- ^{lxxiv} ‘Le SPD est mal informé’, *L’unité*, 166, 1 Jul. 1975, 8.
- ^{lxxv} Antonio Muñoz Sánchez, ‘Entre solidaridad y realpolitik. La socialdemocracia alemana y el socialismo portugués de la dictadura a la democracia’, *Hispania Nova* 15 (2017), 243–273.
- ^{lxxvi} On the reactions of the US to the Portuguese events see: Tiago Moreira de Sá, *Os Americanos na Revolução Portuguesa (1974–1976)* (Lisboa: Editorial Notícias, 2004). On the reaction of the UK see: Castaño, “‘A practical test in détente’”; Simões do Paço, ‘El gobierno Wilson 1974–1976’.
- ^{lxxvii} On the diverse understandings of détente in Europe see: Jussi M. Hanhimäki, ‘Détente in Europe, 1962–1975’, in *The Cambridge History of Cold War, Vol II, Crises and Détente*, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 198–218. On the role played by the Federal Republic of Germany in ‘the stabilisation in Southern Europe’ see all the articles in *Journal of European Integration History*, vol. 15, 1 (2009): 1–196.
- ^{lxxviii} On the American response to the same concern see: Mario Del Pero, “‘Which Chile, Allende?’ Kissinger and the Portuguese Revolution’, *Cold War History* 4 (2011), 625–657; Moreira de Sá, *Os Americanos*.

^{lxxxix} Rôla da Fonseca, Ana Mónica, ‘«É Preciso Regar os Cravos!» A Social-democracia alemã e a transição para a democracia em Portugal (1974-1976)’, PhD diss. ISCTE – University Institute Lisbon, 2012, 149.

^{lxxx} Muñoz, *El amigo alemán*, 184.

^{lxxxi} To get a wider picture of the involvement of German social democracy in Southern Europe in these years see: Giovanni Bernardini, ‘Stability and socialista autonomy. The SPD, the PSI and the Italian political crisis of the 1970s’, *Journal of European Integration History*, 1 (2009), 95–114.

^{lxxxii} 41RI1, ‘Latche (Landes) 23/24.5.75’, Conférence des PS de Europe du Sud (Latche) mai 1975. CAS, FJJ.

^{lxxxiii} 41RI1, ‘Latche (Landes) 23/24.5.75’, Conférence des PS de Europe du Sud (Latche) mai 1975. CAS, FJJ.

^{lxxxiv} 450RI1, Antoine Blanca, Etat de situation au 10 Juin 1975. CAS, FJJ.

^{lxxxv} The critical stance of some communist parties that advocated democracy, such as PCI, could have a negative impact on the strategy of PCP, which was very important for PS. For more on the reaction of the Communist parties of Italy and France to the Portuguese Revolution, see: Alex Macleod, *La révolution inopportune. Les partis communistes français et italien face à la Révolution portugaise (1973–1975)* (Québec: Nouvelle Optique, 1984).

^{lxxxvi} 41RI1, ‘Latche (Landes) 23/24.5.75’, Conférence des PS de Europe du Sud (Latche) mai 1975. CAS, FJJ.

^{lxxxvii} *Junta Democrática* was a coalition led by PCE of several Spanish political forces and influential people opposed to the regime. It was created in Jul. 1974, and besides PCE it included *Partido Socialista Popular*, *Alianza Socialista de Andalucía*, the *Partido del Trabajo de España*, the trade union *Comisiones Obreras*, *Partido Carlista*, and some individual personalities, neighbours’ committees and professional associations.

^{lxxxviii} Gillespie, *The Spanish Socialist Party*; Juliá, *Los socialistas*.

^{lxxxix} 41RI1, ‘Latche, Landes, 23/24.5.75’, Conférence des PS de Europe du Sud (Latche) mai 1975. CAS, FJJ.

^{xc} Muñoz, *El amigo alemán*.

^{xci} Muñoz, ‘The Friedrich Ebert Foundation’.

^{xcii} 424RI3, Antoine Blanca, ‘A propos des socialistes espagnols et de leurs rapports avec le PS Français’. CAS, FJJ.

^{xciii} 41RI1, ‘Complaint by the Democratic Socialist Party of Italy’, Conférence des PS de Europe du Sud (Latche) mai 1975. CAS, FJJ.

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- ^{xciv} 41RI1, 'Letter from Robert Portillon to Antonio Cariglia', 29/05/1975, Conférence des PS de Europe du Sud (Latche) mai 1975. CAS, FJJ.
- ^{xcv} Maxwell, *The Making of Portuguese Democracy*.
- ^{xcvi} 450RI1, Blanca, Antoine, 'Les socialistes portugais et la crise de la révolution'. CAS, FJJ.
- ^{xcvii} Bruno Kreisky did not attend the London meeting.
- ^{xcviii} David Castaño, *Mário Soares e a Revolução* (Alfragide: Publicações Dom Quixote, 2013), 345-358.
- ^{xcix} 450RI1, Secrétariat Nationale. Circulaire 441, 19/08/1975. CAS, FJJ.
- ^c 450RI1, Secrétariat Nationale. Circulaire 442, 26/08/1975. CAS, FJJ.
- ^{ci} For further details of these events, see Castaño, "'A practical test in the détente'", 22-5; Del Pero, "'Which Chile, Allende?'"', 645-6; Moreira de Sá, *Os Americanos*, 135-144.
- ^{cii} 450RI1, Résolution votée a l'unanimité par le comite directeur des 4 et 5 octobre 1975, CAS, FJJ.
- ^{ciii} 450RI1, Quelle type de révolution pour le Portugal?, CAS, FJJ.
- ^{civ} On the divisions within PSF with regard to the Portuguese Revolution see: Granadino, 'Fertile soil for Socialism'.
- ^{cv} 'Le point de vue du CERES', *REPERES. Les cahiers du CERES*, 25, Sept. 1975, 6-9.
- ^{cvi} The document appeared in Etienne Fajon, *L'union est un combat* (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1975).
- ^{cvi} Brown, 'The Common Program in France', 46.
- ^{cvi} See: Alfonso Guerra, *Cuando el tiempo nos alcanza. Memorias (1940-1982)* (Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 2004), 144-149.
- ^{cix} 'El PSOE, hoy', *El Socialista*, 38, second half of Apr. 1975, 1.
- ^{cx} 'Pureza de sangre', *Cambio 16*, 177, 28 Apr. 1975.
- ^{cx} See the whole number: *El Socialista*, 41, first half of Jun. 1975.
- ^{cxii} 424RI1, Letter from Manuel Garnacho to Gilles Martinet, 16/01/1976. CAS, FJJ.
- ^{cxiii} 41RI2, 'Conference des parties socialistes d'Europe du Sud. CAS, FJJ.
- ^{cxiv} 41RI2, 'Manuscrit d'après les notes de R. Pontillon', CAS, FJJ.
- ^{cxv} 41RI2, Jean-Pierre Cot, document addressed to the Assemblée Nationale, 05/01/1976. CAS, FJJ.
- ^{cxvi} These ideas can be inferred from the following document: 41RI3, Letter from Jean-Pierre Cot to the Assemblée Nationale, 05/01/1976. CAS, FJJ.
- ^{cxvii} 41RI3, 'La coordination de l'action des forces de gauche en Europe', 05/12/1975. CAS, FJJ.
- ^{cxviii} As recent research shows, before the Conference the US State Department pressed the leaders of European social democrat parties to halt cooperation between socialists and communists in Southern Europe. See: Michele Di Donato, 'The Southern European 'crises' of the 1970s: Social Democratic Internationalism, the Cold War and Globalisation', paper presented in the conference *North and*

South. A New Approach to the History of Post-war European Social Democracy, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, 22-23 November 2018.

^{cxi} 41RI4, 'Rapport introductif présenté par le PSOE. Coordination de l'action entre les différentes forces de gauche de l'Europe du sud', 24/01/1976, CAS, FJJ. This text was also published in *El Socialista*, 58, 10 Mar. 1976, 4–5.

^{cxx} Felipe González, 'La construcción de una Europa socialista y democrática', *El Socialista*, 58, 10 Mar. 1976, 2–3.

^{cxxi} 14-H 3, Letter from Luis Yañez to Robert Pontillon, 24/12/1976, PSOE's Historical Archive, FPI.

^{cxxii} 41RI11, PS d'Europe du Sud: reencontré à Paris, 05/03/1980, Centre d'Archives Socialistes (CAS), Fondation Jean-Jaurès.

^{cxxiii} The Paris Conference was followed by one in Madrid in May 1977, a month before the first democratic elections in Spain, one in Sintra in September 1980, a month before the parliamentary elections in Portugal, and one in Rhodes in August 1981, two months before the Greek elections.